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After growing rapidly during much of the 1990s, the 
inflation-adjusted value of commercial and indus-
trial (C&I) loans at domestic commercial banks and 
at U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks 
has fallen 19 percent since the beginning of 2001 
(chart 1). 
[note: 1]. C&I loans are business loans not secured by real estate. [emd of note.] 
Chart 1. Real value of C&I loans at banks, 1988-2003 
[the graph starts at about $720 billion in 1988. It goes up  to about $760 billion in 1989. It begins the first recession  in mid 1990 at about $740 billion and ends the beginning  of 1991 at about $710 billion. It goes down to about  $620 billion in 1994, then up to about $1020 billion in  early 2001, when the next recession starts. The recession  ends the end of 2001 and the graph is about $940 billion.  It ends 2003 at about $820 billion.] 
NOTE. The data are monthly through October 2003 and are deflated by the 
price deflator for business-sector output (1996 = 100). Here and in the 
following charts, shaded bars represent recessions as dated by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research. See also text note 2. 
SOURCE. Federal Reserve Board, Statistical Release H.8, "Assets and Lia-
bilities of Commercial Banks in the United States" (www.federalreserve. 
gov/releases/h8); Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
This striking decline in aggregate C&I 
loans masks important differences in lending patterns 
at domestically chartered institutions of different 
sizes and at U.S. branches and agencies of foreign 
banks. A drop in loans at large domestic commercial 
banks and at foreign institutions accounts for the 
entire contraction in C&I loans since January 2001.
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[note: 2]. Banks consist of the following types of institutions in the fifty 
states and the District of Columbia: domestically chartered commer-
cial banks that submit a weekly report of condition (large domestic); 
other domestically chartered commercial banks (small domestic); 
branches and agencies of foreign banks, and Edge Act and agreement 
corporations (foreign-related institutions). Banks exclude interna-
tional banking facilities. The category of large domestic banks in the 
Federal Reserve's weekly H.8 statistical release, "Assets and Liabili-
ties of Commercial Banks in the United States,'' includes about forty 
of the largest domestic commercial banks, which together account for 
about 55 percent of assets held by all domestic banks. Domestic 
institutions not included in the large bank category compose the small 
bank category. Large domestic banks constitute a universe; data for 
small domestic banks and foreign-related institutions are estimates 
based on weekly samples and on quarter-end condition reports. Data 
are adjusted for breaks caused by reclassifications of assets and 
liabilities. The data for large and small domestic banks are also 
adjusted to remove the estimated effects of mergers between these 
two groups. For further details about the H.8 release, see 
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8. [end of note.] 
In contrast, the real growth rate of business loans 
at small commercial banks, though it has declined 
appreciably, has averaged almost 4 percent annually 
since early 2001. The recent runoff in C&I loans 
contrasts sharply with that of the early 1990s: The 
earlier contraction in lending at large and small 
domestic banks was more uniform and was partly 
offset by a robust expansion of business loans at 
foreign institutions (chart 2). 
Chart 2. Real growth rate of C&I loans, 
by type of bank, 1988-2003 
[graph plotting three lines: foreign-related institutions,  large domestic banks, and small domestic banks.  They start 1988 with foreign-related institutions at about  23%, large domestic banks at about -3%, and small  domestic banks at about 2%. They start the first recession  in mid 1990 all at about -2%. They end it early 1991 with  foreign at about 6%, and large and small domestic at  about -6%. Early 1992, foreign is about 17%, and large  and small are about -11%. foreign goes down to meet them  in 1994 at about -3%. In 1995 they are up to about 11%.  In 1999, large and small are at about 11%, foreign at about  -12%. They go through the second recession in 2001 with  small domestic banks at about 13% then 5%, large domestic banks from  about 2% to about -11%, foreign from about 8% to about -10%. They  end 2003 with small domestic banks at about 5%, large domestic banks  at about -10%, and foreign-related institutions at about -24%.] 
NOTE. The data are monthly through October 2003; change is for twelve 
months. See also text note 2. 
Although branches and agencies of foreign banks 
are important participants in the C&I loan market, 
this article focuses on business lending at domestic 
institutions, for two reasons. 
[note: 3]. For further discussion of foreign banking organizations, see 
Allen N. Berger and David C. Smith, "Global Integration in the 
Banking Industry,'' Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 89 (November 
2003), pp. 451-60. [end of note.] 
First, U.S. branches and agencies compete most directly with large domestic 
banks for customers in the C&I loan market. There-
fore, the factors that depressed lending at large 
domestic banks over the past three years likely 
exerted a similar influence on foreign institutions. 
Second, the analysis of business lending at branches 
and agencies of foreign banks is complicated by the 
pronounced downward trend in their share of C&I 
loans (chart 3). The reduced intermediation by for-
eign institutions since the mid-1990s has been due 
largely to a sharp pullback in business lending by the 
U.S. branches and agencies of Japanese banks, many 
of which are saddled with a substantial volume of 
nonperforming loans and face significant pressures 
on their capital positions. 
Chart 3. Share of C&I loans held by U.S. branches and 
agencies of foreign banks, 1988-2003 
[the graph starts 1988 at about 15.5%, goes up to about  26% in 1992, stays between about 25 and 27% until 1997  when it starts going down again, reaching about 19% in  1999 and then about 15.5% in 2003.] 
NOTE. The data are monthly through October 2003. 
SOURCE. Federal Reserve Board, Statistical Release H.8. 
The divergence between large and small domestic 
commercial banks in the growth of business loans 
over the past three years appears to stem from the 
combined effects of weakness in demand for C&I 
loans from larger businesses and a relatively greater 
tightening of supply conditions at large banks. 
Although sharp cutbacks in capital spending and 
steep inventory runoffs since early 2001 have sig-
nificantly reduced demand for C&I loans from bor-
rowers of all sizes, the decline in loan demand from 
larger corporate borrowers—which maintain lending 
relationships mainly with large banks—has been 
especially pronounced. The reduction in demand for 
business loans from larger firms has been exacer-
bated by an evaporation of merger and acquisition 
(M&A) activity and a substitution of bond finance for 
bank loans on firms' balance sheets. On the supply 
side, large commercial banks tightened their credit 
standards and began imposing more stringent loan 
terms well before the recent economic downturn. 
These institutions further tightened their commercial 
credit policies as the economy slipped into recession 
and as a substantial deterioration in the credit quality 
of their borrowers pushed delinquencies and charge-
offs on C&I loans to high levels. 
The move toward a more stringent lending posture 
by domestic commercial banks before and during the 
recent economic downturn, although partly cyclical, 
has also been influenced by a reassessment of the 
risk-return tradeoff inherent in C&I lending, espe-
cially relative to the lax lending atmosphere of the 
mid-1990s. These structural changes in the way com-
mercial banks price and allocate certain forms of 
business credit likely represent the cumulative effect 
of significant institutional developments in the C&I 
loan market since the late 1980s. In large part, these 
developments have arisen from the increased partici-
pation of nonbank financial institutions in the syn-
dicated loan market, which in turn has contributed 
importantly to the growth of the secondary loan mar-
ket and of leveraged lending—that is, lending to 
large below-investment-grade borrowers. To the 
extent that these markets are almost exclusively prov-
inces of large financial institutions, the reassessment 
of the attractiveness of syndicated and some forms 
of traditional C&I lending has disproportionately 
affected large commercial banks and has contributed 
to the divergence in business lending patterns 
between large and small domestic banks. 
Chart 4. Change in real value of bank credit, 1988-2003 
[the graph starts 1988 at about 3.5%, then down to about  -1% in 1991, then up to about 7% in 1995. Then it moves  up and down between about 1% and 10% for the rest of  the graph, ending at about 6.5% in 2003.] 
NOTE. The data are monthly through October 2003 and are deflated by the 
GDP price deflator (1996 = 100); change is for twelve months. 
SOURCE. Federal Reserve Board, Statistical Release H.8. 
In contrast to C&I loans, other forms of credit at 
domestic commercial banks have flowed relatively 
freely during the past several years. Although the 
growth of real bank credit declined notably during 
the 2001 recession, it did not fall as low as it did 
in the early 1990s, and its recovery has been much brisker (chart 4). In this cycle, bank credit has been 
buoyed by a substantial expansion of banks' real 
estate portfolios and holdings of mortgage-backed 
securities. At the same time, the growth of consumer 
spending has held up well, allowing commercial 
banks to continue increasing their holdings of credit 
card and other types of consumer loans. Partly as a 
result of the robust lending to households, a resilient 
commercial real estate loan market, and growth in 
fee-generating lines of business, commercial banks 
have remained highly profitable despite an increase 
in loan losses, especially on C&I loans (chart 5). 
Thus, in sharp contrast to the circumstances of the 
early 1990s and despite some restrictions on the 
supply of business credit from large domestic com-
mercial banks, the banking sector has remained well 
capitalized and is poised to support growth in demand 
for business loans (chart 6). 
Chart 5. Measures of bank profitability, 1985-2003:Q3 
[this graph plots two lines: return on equity, and return on  assets. Return on equity starts at about 11%, return on  assets about .7%. In 1986, equity was about 1.5%, assets  about .1%. In 1988, equity was up to about 11.8%, assets  about .7%. 1989 through 1991 they were about at 7.5% for  equity, and about .5% for assets. 1n 1991 equity was up to  about 15.5%, and assets about 1.25. Equity stays between  13.5 and 15.5% for the rest of the graph, and assets stays  between about 1.15 and 1.3%, ending 2003 at about 1.38%,  equity ending at about 15%.] 
NOTE. The return on equity and the return on assets are annual; for 2003, 
they are estimates based on seasonally adjusted data through 2003:Q3. 
SOURCE. Call Report. 
Chart 6. Regulatory capital ratios, 1990-2003:Q3 
[graph plotting three lines: total (tier 1 + tier 2) ratio, Tier  1 ratio, and leverage ratio.  Total ratio starts at about 9.5% in 1990, goes up to about  13.2% in 1994, slides down to about 12% in 2000, then  ends 2003 at about 13%.  Tier 1 ratio starts at about 7.7% in 1990, goes up to about  10.7% in 1994, then down to about 9.2% in 2000, then  ends 2003 at about 10.2%.  Leverage ratio starts at about 6.3%, goes up to about  7.8%, then mostly stays there for the rest of the graph,  varying maybe .1 to .2%.] 
NOTE. Regulatory capital ratios are seasonally adjusted. Tier 1 capital 
consists primarily of common equity (excluding intangible assets such as 
goodwill and net unrealized gains on investment account securities classified 
as available for sale) and certain perpetual preferred stock. Tier 2 capital 
consists primarily of subordinated debt, preferred stock not included in tier 1 
capital, and loan-loss reserves. Total capital is tier 1 plus tier 2 capital. 
Risk-weighted assets are calculated by multiplying the amount of assets and 
the credit-equivalent amount of off-balance-sheet items (an estimate of the 
potential credit exposure posed by the item) by the risk weight for each 
category. The risk weights rise from 0 to 1 as the credit risk of the assets 
increases. The leverage ratio is the ratio of tier 1 capital to average tangible 
assets. Tangible assets are equal to total assets less assets excluded from 
common equity in the calculation of tier 1 capital. 
SOURCE. Call Report. 
FACTORS AFFECTING THE DEMAND 
FOR C&I LOANS. 
Between 1997 and 2000, spending on capital equip-
ment by businesses boomed. As a result, the gap 
between capital expenditures and internally gener-
ated funds for the nonfarm nonfinancial corporate 
sector—relative to the output of the sector—shot up 
from 1 1/2 percent at the end of 1997 to more than 
4 percent at its peak in 2000 (chart 7). Concomitantly, 
the bull market in equities supported a frenzied pace 
of mergers and acquisitions, for many of which com-
mercial banks provided initial financing. Not surpris-
ingly, the expansion of C&I loans at both large and 
small domestic commercial banks reached double-
digit annual rates over this period. 
Chart 7. Financing gap at nonfarm nonfinancial 
corporations, 1988-2003:Q2 
[the graph starts 1988 at about 0%. By 1989 it was up to  about 1.3%. When the recession in mid 1990 started, the  line starts dropping, reaching about .5% by the end in early  1991. Then it varies between about .75 and 1.25% until  1996, when it starts climbing, reaching about 4% in 2000.  Then the graph falls, hitting about 2.5% in the recession  beginning early 2001 and ending the recession the end of  2001 at about 1.4%. It ends 2003 at about .4%] 
NOTE. The data are annual through 2002; for 2003, they are estimates 
based on data through 2003:Q2. The financing gap is the difference between 
capital expenditures and internally generated funds, expressed as a fraction of 
output by the nonfarm nonfinancial corporate sector. 
SOURCE. Federal Reserve Board, Statistical Release Z.1, "Flow of Funds 
Accounts of the United States," table L.101 (www.federalreserve.gov/ 
releases/z1). 
The strong pace of corporate spending, how-
ever, proved unsustainable, and companies sharply 
reduced their capital expenditures as the economy 
entered recession in March 2001. Firms also responded 
quickly to falling sales by curtailing production to avoid an accumulation of inventories and associated 
financing costs. Compounding the reduction in 
demand for business credit, especially at large banks, 
was the steep drop in equity prices, which largely 
short-circuited M&A activity. With capital spending 
and merger activity dropping off, extensions of loans 
slumped. A sluggish recovery in an uncertain eco-
nomic climate did little to lift business fixed invest-
ment in 2002, and businesses lacked an incentive to 
rebuild depleted inventory stocks. Although capital 
spending has picked up in 2003, a rebound in corpo-
rate profits, partly reflecting robust gains in produc-
tivity, has limited firms' needs for external funds. As 
a result, the financing gap has remained at its pre-
boom level. Credit demands to finance mergers and 
acquisitions have also remained weak despite a sub-
stantial rise in equity prices in 2003. 
The cyclical fluctuations in demand for C&I loans 
are evident in the responses to the Federal Reserve's 
Senior Loan officer opinion Survey on Bank Lend-
ing Practices (informally, the bank lending prac-
tices survey, or BLPS). 
[note: 4]. For text of questions and tallies of responses in surveys con-
ducted since the beginning of 1997, see www.federalreserve.gov/ 
boarddocs/SnLoanSurvey. [end of note.] 
According to the survey, the 
demand for C&I loans from small firms, as well as 
middle-market and large firms, has weakened con-
tinuously since the middle of 2000 (chart 8). More-
over, the reported weakening in demand has persisted 
considerably longer after the official end of the most 
recent recession than it did after the cyclical trough in 
March 1991. 
Chart 8. Net percentage of banks reporting stronger demand 
for C&I loans, by size of borrower, 1991:Q4-2003:Q4 
[graph plotting two lines: Large and middle-market, and small.  In 1991 large and middle were about -30%, small about  -25%. In 1992 they are up with large and middle about 25%,  and small about 5%. Until 2000, large and middle vary  between about 0 and 35%, small between about -5 and 35%.  During 2000 they drop under 0, and remain there, hitting  minimums the end of 2001 with large and medium at about  -70% and small at about -50%. They end 2003 with large  and medium at about -10% and small at about -5%.] 
NOTE. The data are quarterly. Net percentage is the percentage of banks 
reporting stronger demand less the percentage reporting the opposite. The 
definition for firm size sugggested for, and generally used by, survey 
repondents is that large and middle-market firms have sales of more than 
$50 million. 
SOURCE. Federal Reserve Board, Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on 
Bank Lending Practices. 
A detailed look at the fluctuations in demand for 
C&I loans is possible from 1997 onward because 
respondents to the BLPS have been queried regularly 
since then about the factors affecting demand for 
business loans at their banks. Consistent with the 
retrenchment in investment spending, the most cited 
reason for the reported decline in demand at respon-
dent banks since the end of 2000 has been a decrease 
in their customers' capital expenditures (chart 9). 
Chart 9. Change in real spending on equipment and software 
and the net percentage of banks reporting stronger 
demand for C&I loans as a result of increased capital 
expenditures, 1997:Q1-2003:Q4 
[graph plotting two lines: equipment and software, and reporting  stronger demand. In 1997 equipment and software is about 11.5%,  reporting stronger demand about 15%. By early 2000 equipment  and software is down to about 10%, and reporting stronger demand  is down to about 0%. Then there is a steeper drop, at the end of  2001 equipment and software is down to about -8%, reporting  stronger demand down to about -70%. Then they rise, by 2003:Q4  equipment and software is at about 6% and reporting stronger  demand to about -15%.] 
NOTE. The data are quarterly; change is for four quarters. Net percentage is 
the percentage of banks reporting stronger demand because of increased 
capital expenditures less the percentage reporting weaker demand because of 
reduced capital expenditures. 
SOURCES. Federal Reserve Board, Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on 
Bank Lending Practices; Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Chart 10. Change in real nonfarm inventories and the net 
percentage of banks reporting stronger demand 
for C&I loans as a result of increased inventory 
financing needs, 1997:Q4-2003:Q4 
[graph plotting two lines: inventories, and reporting stronger demand.  in 1997:Q4, inventories was about 5.2%. It stayed between about  4.5 and 6.5% through 2000. Then there was a big drop, bringing it  down to about -5% the end of 2001. Then up to about 1% in 2003:Q1.  It ends 2003:Q2 at about -.5%.  Reporting stronger demand starts 1997:Q4 at about 22%. By mid  1998 it had dropped to about -3%. Up to about 15% in early 1999,  back down to about -3% in 1999:Q3, then up to about 10% in  2000:Q2. Then it drops, reaching about -55% in 2001:Q4. It finishes  2003:Q4 at about -8%.] 
NOTE. The data are quarterly; change is for four quarters. Net percentage is 
the percentage of banks reporting stronger demand because of increased 
inventory financing needs less the percentage reporting weaker demand 
because of reduced inventory financing needs. 
SOURCE. See source note to chart 9. Similarly, the sharp inventory runoff since early 2001 
is closely correlated with the net percentage of survey 
respondents that reported a reduction in inventory-
related financing needs (chart 10). On average, about 
half the largest banks on the survey panel—the insti-
tutions most likely to fund large M&A deals— 
indicated that their customers' needs for this type 
of financing had decreased over the past three years 
(chart 11). These responses correspond reasonably 
well with movements in retired equity of domes-
tic nonfinancial corporations—a proxy for M&A 
activity—and support the view that large banks expe-
rienced a relatively bigger drop in C&I loan demand 
than did small banks. 
Chart: 11. Net equity retirements by domestic corporations and 
the net percentage of large banks reporting stronger 
demand for C&I loans as a result of increased M&A 
financing needs, 1998:Q1-2003:Q4 
[graph plotting two lines: reporting stronger demand, and  net equity retirements. Reporting stronger demand starts  1998:Q1 at about 2%, then peaks in 1998:Q4 at about 35%.  Then down to about 0% in 1999:Q2. It stays between 0 and  5% until 2000:Q3 where it starts dropping, reaching about  -45% in 2001:Q1. It stays between -40 and -50% until  early 2002, when it starts rising, ending 2003:Q3 at about  -5%.  Net equity retirements starts 1998:Q1 at about $33 billion. It is up to about  $38 billion in late 1998. Down to about $23 billion in the first half of 1999.  Up to about $40 billion by the end of 1999. Then drastic shifts in 2000,  about $20 billion in Q1, $55 billion in Q2, $23 billion in Q3, and  $63 billion in Q4. Then about $20 billion in 2001:Q1. then it stays between  about 10 and $20 billion until the end of 2002, when it reaches about  $8 billion, then ends 2003:Q4 at about $18 billion.] 
NOTE. The data are quarterly; change is for four quarters. In 1998, large 
banks were those with assets of more than $15 billion; since 1999, large 
banks have been those with assets of more than $20 billion. Net percentage is 
the percentage of banks reporting stronger demand because of increased 
M&A financing needs less the percentage reporting weaker demand because 
of reduced M&A financing needs. 
SOURCES. Federal Reserve Board, Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on 
Bank Lending Practices; Securities Data Company. 
Another factor contributing to the weakness in 
demand for business loans since 2001 has been heavy 
corporate bond issuance, as firms have substituted 
longer-term debt for short-term debt obligations, such 
as C&I loans and commercial paper (chart 12). The 
runoff in commercial paper significantly reduced the 
demand for commercial paper backup lines of credit, 
which are provided mainly by large commercial 
banks. 
[note: 5]. In assigning a credit rating to an issuer of commercial paper, 
public rating agencies take into account the borrower's general credit 
quality as well as the borrower's ability to obtain from a financial 
institution a line of credit that can be used to retire maturing paper in 
the event that it cannot be rolled over. Firms have a strong incentive 
to issue highly rated commercial paper because money market mutual 
funds—the primary holders of these securities—can hold only a 
limited amount of lower-rated commercial paper. [end of note.] 
Chart 12. Major components of net business 
financing, 1992-2003 
[bar graph plotting three data: commercial paper, bonds, and C&I loans.  Commercial paper was about $20 billion in 1992 and 1993, then about  $30 billion in 1994 and 1995, then about $10 billion in 1996, about  $20 billion in 1997, about $30 billion in 1998, about $50 billion in 1999,  about $80 billion in 2000:H1, $40 billion in 2000:H2, -$180 billion in  2001:H1, -$30 billion in 2001:H2. -$120 billion in 2002:H1, -$30 billion  in 2002:H2, about -$60 billion in 2003:H1, and 0 in 2003:H2.  Bonds was about $170 billion in 1992, about $190 billion in 1993, about  $120 billion in 1994 through 1996, about $200 billion in 1997, about  $210 billion in 1998 and 1999, about $170 billion in 2000. about  $450 billion in 2001:H1 about $280 billion in 2001:h2, about $230 billion  in 2002:h1 and $50 billion in 2002:H2. About $240 billion in 2003:h1,  and about $80 billion in 2003:h2.  C&I loans was about -$20 billion in 1992, -$10 billion in 1993, then  between about 60 and $100 billion between 1994 and 1999. It was about  $120 billion in 2000:H1, $70 billion in 2000:H2. -$50 billion in 2001:H1,  about -$80 billion in 2001:H2, about -$70 billion in 2002:H1, -$60 billion  in 2002:H2, about -$70 billion in 2003:h1, and -$100 billion in 2003:H2.] 
NOTE. Beginning in 2000, the data are semi-annual and are at seasonally 
adjusted annual rates. The data for 2003:H2 are projected from data through 
October. 
Accordingly, firms' preference for longer-
term, public-market debt partly reduced the unused 
lines of credit at commercial banks (chart 13). 
Chart 13. Change in the amount of real unused business 
credit lines at U.S. commercial banks, 
1991:Q2-2003:Q3 
[graph starts 1991:Q2 at about -6%. Down to about -7.5%  in late 1991, then up to about 13% in 1995, about 8% in  1997, about 16.5% in 1998, down to about -6% in 2002,  then ending 2003 at about -2.5%.] 
NOTE. The data are quarterly and are deflated by the price deflator for 
business-sector output (1996 = 100); change is for four quarters. 
SOURCE. Call Report. 
Firms' decisions to lengthen the average maturity 
of their outstanding debt was importantly influenced 
by substantial declines in longer-term interest rates 
in 2001 and 2002 (chart 14). In addition, ratings 
agencies and investors reportedly pressured some 
large corporations to strengthen their balance sheets 
by reducing their reliance on short-term debt. The 
restructuring of firms' balance sheets is reflected in 
the sharp drop in the ratio of short-term debt to total 
debt outstanding from almost 40 percent in 1999 to 
about 30 percent in the second quarter of 2003 
(chart 15). Chart 14. Corporate bond yields, by rating, 1989-2003 
[graph plotting three lines: high yield, bbb and aa.  BBB and AA mostly mirror each other, with BBB staying  between .5 and 1% higher than AA. They start 1989 with  BBB about 10.5% and AA about 9.75%. By the end of 1993  they have moved down with BBB about 6.5%, AA about 6%.  They stay between 8.5 and 6% until the beginning of 2002,  when they start dropping below. By 2003 BBB was at about  5.75%, and AA about 4.5%.  High yield starts in 1990 at about 17%, jumps to about 20.5%  by the end of 1990, then drops, hitting about 9.5% in 1994.  It stays between about 9 and 12.5% until 1999 when it starts  rising above, reaching about 14% in late 200. It stays  between there and 12$ until 2003 when it drops to about  8.5%.] 
NOTE. The data are monthly averages through October 2003. The AA and 
BBB rates are calculated from bonds in the Merrill Lynch AA index and 
BBB index, respectively, with seven to ten years of maturity remaining. The 
high-yield rate is the yield on the Merrill Lynch 175 high-yield index. 
Chart 15. Ratio of short-term debt to total credit-market debt 
for nonfarm nonfinancial corporations, 1988-2003:Q2 
[The graph starts 1988 at about 43%. it goes up to about  45% in mid 1990, then down to about 38.5% in 1993. Up  to about 41.5% in 1995, then down to about 39% in 1999.  It ends 2003 at about 30%.] 
NOTE. The data are annual through 2002; for 2003, they are estimates 
based on data from 2003:Q2. 
SOURCE. Federal Reserve Board, Statistical Release Z.1, "Flow of Funds 
Accounts of the United States," table L.102 (www.federalreserve.gov/ 
releases/z1). 
Commercial real estate lending may also have 
helped reduce demand for C&I loans. Over the past 
several years, nonresidential construction activity has 
decelerated significantly, office vacancy rates have 
increased, and commercial rents have declined. 
Nonetheless, this type of lending has been surpris-
ingly well maintained during the recent cycle, and 
delinquency and charge-off rates on commercial real 
estate loans have risen only moderately from very 
low levels. The continued growth of commercial real 
estate loans may be due to efforts by some firms to 
lock in low long-term interest rates by substituting 
fixed-rate loans backed by real estate for traditional 
business loans, which typically have shorter maturi-
ties and carry floating rates. Indeed, according to the 
August 2002 BLPS, one-fourth of banks with assets 
of less than $20 billion—institutions that in recent 
years have experienced particularly strong growth 
in commercial real estate lending—reported that the 
volume of their commercial real estate loans that 
were used for commercial and industrial purposes 
(rather than the acquisition or improvement of real 
estate) had increased over the previous year. A small 
net percentage of those banks reported in the October 
2003 BLPS that they had continued to experience an 
increase in demand for commercial real estate loans 
for which the proceeds were earmarked for commer-
cial and industrial purposes. 
FACTORS AFFECTING THE SUPPLY 
OF C&I LOANS. 
The recent runoff in C&I loans appears to be related 
not only to weaker demand but also to tighter loan 
supply conditions. The effects from tighter supply, 
however, do not seem to be as significant as they 
were in the early 1990s. Many large commercial 
banks entered the previous decade with low levels of 
equity capital, partly because of considerable losses 
stemming from the Latin American debt crisis of the 
mid-1980s. The collapse of the commercial real estate 
market in the early 1990s also impaired banks' profit-
ability and further eroded their capital bases. At the 
same time, commercial banks were coming under 
significant pressure from bank regulators and inves-
tors to rebuild their capital, pressure that was intensi-
fied by the adoption of the Basel standards for risk-
based capital. Because commercial banks are not 
required to hold risk-based capital against U.S. Trea-
sury securities, the attractiveness of these invest-
ments rose relative to that of loans. Under these 
circumstances, commercial banks became increas-
ingly reluctant to lend to households or businesses. 
The inhospitable business-borrowing environment of 
the early 1990s is reflected in the significant net 
percentages of BLPS respondents that reported a 
tightening of lending standards in surveys conducted 
during that period (chart 16). The period was also 
marked by weak demand for credit, as households 
and businesses moved to strengthen their own balance 
sheets after heavy borrowing during the late 1980s. 
Chart 16. Net percentage of banks that reported tightening standards for C&I loans, by size of borrower, 1990:Q2-2003:Q4.[graph plotting two lines: large and middle-market, and small. Small starts 1990:Q2 at about 53%, drops to  about -18% in 1995, is up to about 45% in 2001, ends 2003 at about -1%. Large and middle-market starts at about 57% in 1990:Q2, drops to about -20% in 1993, up to about 60% in 2001,then ends 2003 at about 0%.]  Note. The data are quarterly. Net percentage is the percentage of banks that reported a tightening of standards less the percentage that reported an easing. The definition for firm size suggested for, and generally used by, survey  respondents is that large and middle-market firms have sales of more than $50 million.  Source. Federal Reserve Board, Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices. 
As the economy recovered from the 1990-91 
recession, borrowers and banks rebuilt their balance 
sheets, and commercial banks expanded their lend-
ing. The industry's asset quality and profitability 
improved, lifting banks' regulatory capital ratios 
significantly above regulatory minimums. Partly 
because of the brighter economic outlook, higher capital levels, and better asset quality, commercial 
banks by 1993 had begun easing their lending stan-
dards and accepting lower spreads on C&I loans and 
credit lines. Banks also reported easing nonprice 
lending terms, such as loan covenants and collateral 
requirements, which are designed to protect banks 
if a borrower becomes impaired before the loan is 
repaid. Over the same period, the net percentage of 
small firms reporting that credit was harder to obtain 
declined considerably, according to the Survey of 
Small Businesses conducted by the National Federa-
tion of Independent Business (chart 17). 
Chart 17. Net percentage of small businesses that reported 
more difficulty in obtaining credit, 1988-2003:Q3 
[the graph starts 1988 at about 6%. it moves up to about 9.5%  by 1989, but drops to about 6% by the end of 1989, Then  rises to about 10.5% in mid 1990, then in 1992 begins to  drop, reaching about .5% in 1999. Up to about 6% by mid  2000, then ends 2003 at about 3%.] 
NOTE. The net percentage is defined as the number of borrowers that 
reported more difficulty in obtaining credit less the number that reported 
more ease in obtaining credit as a fraction of borrowers who sought credit 
during the previous three months. 
SOURCE. National Federation of Independent Business, Survey of Small 
Businesses. 
Market commentary, as well as narrow credit 
spreads on corporate debt instruments, also suggested 
that lending conditions had become very favorable 
for business borrowers, especially as the economy 
began to accelerate over the latter half of the 1990s. 
By the middle of 1998, bank supervisors and examin-
ers had become increasingly concerned about banks' 
lending practices, as evidenced by statements from 
the Federal Reserve and other bank regulatory agen-
cies. One statement urged banks to ''continue to 
focus on the strength of the credit-risk management 
process, not only under favorable conditions, but also 
under stressful circumstances.'' 
[note: 6]. The Federal Reserve's Division of Banking Supervision and 
Regulation sent to the banks that it supervises a letter on lend-
ing standards for commercial loans. See letter SR 98-18, 
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SRLETTERS/1998/SR9818.htm. [end of note.] 
The warnings of bank regulators took on a pro-
phetic dimension in August 1998, when the Russian 
government announced a moratorium on servicing 
official short-term debt and devalued the ruble. The 
resulting shockwaves, exacerbated by difficulties at 
a prominent hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Man-
agement, led to turbulence in capital markets in the 
United States and elsewhere: Credit spreads bal-
looned, and liquidity deteriorated. Although the u.S. 
economy remained strong and the Federal Open Mar-
ket Committee eased monetary policy that fall in 
three increments of 25 basis points each, commercial 
banks nevertheless seemed to respond by reassess-
ing the riskiness of their business lending. Abruptly 
reversing course, nearly half the respondents to the 
November 1998 BLPS indicated that they had tight-
ened business lending standards and terms over the 
preceding three months, the highest net percentage 
that had reported doing so since early 1991. In 
addition, banks disproportionately imposed more-
stringent commercial lending standards on large and 
middle-market borrowers, which they had apparently 
started to perceive as riskier credits. 
Although the net proportion of banks that reported 
tightening lending standards declined markedly in 
subsequent surveys, it remained positive, and other 
indicators also continued to suggest that the easy 
lending environment of the mid-1990s had come to 
an end. In late 1998, spreads on originations of new 
C&I loans—measured relative to estimated bank 
funding costs—increased significantly, as reported 
in the Federal Reserve's quarterly Survey of Terms 
of Business Lending (STBL) (chart 18). The wider 
spreads evident in the STBL were mirrored in a 
substantial jump of spreads and fees on syndicated loans, particularly for weak-investment-grade and 
below-investment-grade borrowers, according to data 
collected by the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC) 
(chart 19). Pricing of business loans and corporate 
bonds continued to hover in the new, elevated range 
even after the stock market resumed its upward 
march, the liquidity of the bond market improved, 
and the U.S. economy continued to perform as well 
as it had in decades. 
Chart 18. Spread on C&I loans at domestic banks, 1997-2003:Q3 
[this graph starts at about 150 basis points in 1997,  runs up to about 240 basis points by early 2003, then drops  to about 220 basis points by 2003:Q3.] 
NOTE. Spread is the difference between the loan rate and the bank's 
funding cost, represented by a eurodollar or swap interest rate of comparable 
maturity. 
SOURCE. Federal Reserve Board, Survey of Terms of Business Lending. 
Chart 19. All-in drawn spreads on syndicated loans of maturity 
greater than one year, by rating of borrower, 1998-2003 
[graph plotting two lines: BBB and B.  BBB starts 1998 at about 30 basis points. It's up to about  85 basis points by 1999. It bounces between about 70 and  100 basis points, ending 2003 at about 90.  B starts 1998 at about 275 basis points, goes up to about  380 basis points by early 1999, then stays between 340 and  410 basis points until 2003 when it goes up to about 450  in mid 2003, but then drops to about 325 by the end of  2003.] 
NOTE. Data are monthly through October 2003. All-in drawn spreads 
reflect the amount a lender will earn on a facility, considering all fees (except 
usage fees) and the libor spread, assuming the entire credit facility is drawn 
down. 
SOURCE. Loan Pricing Corporation. 
Despite the tighter lending standards that banks put 
in place in late 1998 and the strong economic growth 
during 1999 and the first half of 2000, the delin-
quency rate on C&I loans at large banks trended 
higher (chart 20). 
Chart 20. Delinquency and net charge-off rates on C&I 
loans at banks, by size of bank, 1988-2003:Q3 
[this chart has two graphs: Delinquencies and Net charge-offs.  Top graph: delinquencies. Plots two lines: 100 largest and other.  100 largest starts at about 5.9% in 1988. It is down to about 5% in  1990. Up to about 6.5% in early 1991. Then down to about 1.8% in  1994. Then a softer decline to about 1.2% in 1997. Then up to about  4.3% in 2002. Then ends 2003:Q3 at about 3.5%.  Other started 1988 at about 5.1%, went down to about 4.7% in 1989,  then up to about 6% in 1991. Then a drop to about 2.4% in 1995. It  stays around there until early 2000, then us up to about 3.3% in 2001.  Down to about 2.8% in 2003:Q3.] 
[bottom graph: Net charge-offs. Plots two lines: 100 largest  and other.  100 largest starts 1988 at about .9%. By late 1989, it was  down to about .75%. Then it heads up and hit about 2% in  1992. Then it's down to about .1% in 1995. It stays around  there until 1997 when it starts heading up, reaching about  2.1% in 2002. It ends 2003:Q3 at about 1.55%.  Other starts 1988 at about 1.3%. In 1989 it was down to  about 1.1%.Then up again, to about 1.6% in 1992. Then  down again to about .25% in 1995. A slow rise to about .5%  in early 2001. Then a sharper rise to about 1.4% in 2002.  It ends 2003:Q3 at about .9%.] 
NOTE. The data are quarterly and seasonally adjusted. Delinquent loans are 
loans that are not accruing interest and those that are accruing interest but are 
more than thirty days past due. The delinquency rate is the end-of-period 
level of delinquent loans divided by the end-of-period level of outstanding 
loans. The net charge-off rate is the annualized amount of charge-offs over 
the period, net of recoveries, divided by the average level of outstanding 
loans over the period. 
SOURCE. Call Reports. 
According to the January 2000 
BLPS, the deterioration in business loan quality since 
1998 was due partly to the reversion of delinquency 
rates to a more-normal long-run level and to prob-
lems that had developed in some industries, particu-
larly health care. But as the long bull market in stocks 
came to an end in spring 2000 and the economy 
began to show signs of slowing in the fall, delinquen-
cies and charge-offs on C&I loans at commercial 
banks accelerated. In light of this further deteriora-
tion in asset quality, the November 2000 BLPS asked 
banks about the extent to which the rise in delinquen-
cies on C&I loans had been in line with their expecta-
tions. Although the smaller banks indicated that they 
had largely anticipated the gradual increase in delin-
quency rates, a significant net percentage of larger 
banks on the survey panel reported that they were 
surprised by how much the quality of their C&I loan 
portfolios had deteriorated over the previous two 
years. (chart 21). Evidence from other data sources corrobo-
rated these qualitative responses from the BLPS: The 
spreads on loans in the riskier categories in the STBL 
increased steadily during 2001 and the first half of 
2002, and they increased to a much greater extent 
than did the spreads on loans rated as having ''low'' 
or ''minimal'' risk (chart 22). 
Chart 21. Net percentage of banks that reported higher 
premiums on riskier loans, by size of borrower, 
1998:Q4-2003:Q4 
[graph plotting two lines: large and middle-market, and small.  Large and middle-market stats 1998:Q4 at about 55%. Then by  1999:Q2 it was down to about 20%. Then a climb to about 70%  in 2001:Q1. Then the graph mostly falls, hitting about 18% in  2003:Q4.  Small starts at about 30% in 1998:Q4. Down to about 20% in  1999:Q3. Then up, hitting about 60% in 2001:Q1. Down to  about 40% in 2001:Q2. Then up to about 55% in 2001:Q4.  then mostly dropping, reaching about 18% in 2003:Q4.] 
NOTE. The data are quarterly. Net percentage is the percentage of banks 
reporting higher premiums less the percentage reporting lower premiums. 
The definition for firm size suggested for, and generally used by, survey 
respondents is that large and middle-market firms have sales of more than 
$50 million. 
SOURCE. Federal Reserve Board, Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on 
Bank Lending Practices. 
Chart 22. Spread on C&I loans at domestic banks, by 
risk category of loan, 1997-2003:Q3 
[graph plotting two lines, moderate and high, and minimal  and low.  Moderate and high starts 1997 at about 180 basis points.  it varies slightly on its climb throughout the graph,  reaching about 270 basis points in 2003.  Minimal and low starts 1997 at about 80 basis points and  varies slightly on its climb throughout the graph, reaching  about 130 basis points in 2003.] 
NOTE. Spread is the difference between the loan rate and the bank's 
funding cost, represented by a eurodollar or swap interest rate of comparable 
maturity. High-risk loans are those in risk categories acceptable and 
classified. 
SOURCE. Federal Reserve Board, Survey of Terms of Business Lending. 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, dra-
matically raised the overall level of economic uncer-
tainty. corporate balance sheets had already deterio-
rated, and corporate profitability had declined sharply 
during the year, accelerating the pace of ratings 
downgrades and increasing defaults on corporate debt 
(chart 23). 
Chart 23. Indicators of the credit quality of nonfinancial 
corporations, 1990-2003:Q3 ' 
[chart has two graphs: default rate on outstanding bonds,  and ratings changes of nonfinancial corporations.  Top graph: default rate on outstanding bonds. Starts 1990  at about 1.75%. Goes up to about 3.3% in 1991. By 1993  it is down to about .25%. It stays between about 0 and .5%  through 1998, then it tends upwards, reaching about 3.8%  the end of 2002, then ends 2003 at about .75%.] 
[bottom graph: ratings changes of nonfinancial corporations.  Bar graph plotting two data: upgrades and downgrades.  Upgrades was about 8% in 1990, about 14% in 1991, 7% in 1992, 9% in  1993, 7% in 1994, 20% in 1995, 11% in 1996, 9% in 1997, 15% in 1998,  13% in 1999, 10% in 2000, 6% in 2001, 3% in 2002, and about 5% in 2003.  Down grades was about 25% in 1990, about 27% in 1991, 37% in 1992,  16% in 1993, 10% in 1994, 85 in 1995, 11% in 1996, 10% in 1997 and 1998,  16% in 1999, 21% in 2000, 31% in 2002, and about 18% in 2003.] 
NOTE. The default rate is monthly and extends through October 2003. The 
default rate for a given month is the face value of bonds that defaulted in the 
six months ending in that month divided by the face value of all bonds 
outstanding at the end of the calendar quarter immediately preceding the 
six-month period. The data on ratings changes are at an annual rate; for 2003, 
they are the annualized values of monthly data through October. Debt 
upgrades and downgrades are expressed as percentages of the par values of 
all bonds outstanding. 
SOURCE. Moody's Investors Service. 
The collapse of Enron in early December 
2001 and subsequent corporate accounting scandals 
cast doubt on the quality of auditing and corporate 
governance. And the possibility that more firms 
would be found to have engaged in questionable 
accounting practices exacerbated the general sense of 
Responding to the worsening economic outlook 
and the deterioration in their asset quality, large net 
percentages of banks began reporting in late 2000 
and in 2001 that they had further tightened lending 
standards and had imposed higher spreads and fees 
on c&I loans for borrowers of all sizes. According to 
the respondents, the shift to a more-stringent lending 
posture also resulted from a reduced appetite for risk 
at their institutions, and nearly all banks reported that 
they had raised premiums charged on riskier c&I 
loans, especially for large and middle-market firms uncertainty, especially for large business borrowers. 
However, small companies with straightforward busi-
ness models were less likely to have used ques-
tionable accounting practices, and the NFIB's Survey 
of Small Businesses showed little evidence that 
small firms were facing significantly tighter credit 
conditions. 
With the uncertain economic climate and corporate 
governance concerns, the net percentage of banks 
that reported tightening lending standards and terms 
in the BLPS remained elevated through the first half 
of 2002. In addition, responses to a question in the 
October 2001 BLPS indicated that almost one-half of 
banks had lowered their internal ratings on at least 
5 percent of their rated c&I loans over the previous 
three months, and several banks had downgraded 
more than 20 percent of these loans. These reported 
downgrades showed up in the STBL as banks 
assigned higher risk ratings to larger shares of newly 
originated loans: The share of STBL loans rated as 
high risk rose from about 30 percent in 2001 to 
almost 50 percent in the first quarter of 2003 
(chart 24). 
chart 24. Distribution of C&I loan volume at domestic banks, 
by risk category of loan, 1998-2003:Q3 
[Bar graph plotting three data: high, moderate, and minimal and low.  In 1998, High was about 25%, Moderate about 40%, minimal and low about  35%. In 1999 High was about 25%, Moderate about 37%, and minimal and  low about 38%. In 2000, high was about 23%, Moderate about 40%, Minimal  and low about 37%. In 2001 High was about 26%, Moderate about 40%,  minimal and low about 34%. In 2002:Q1 high was about 25%, Moderate was  about 40%, minimal and low about 35%. In 2002:Q2 high was about 35%,  moderate about 36%, minimal and low about 29%. In 2002:Q3 high was about  35%, moderate about 40%, minimal and low about 25%. In 2002:Q4 high was  about 38%, moderate about 42%, minimal and low about 20%, In 2003:Q1  high was about 45%, moderate about 35%, minimal and low about 20%. In  2003:Q2 high was about 37%, moderate about 40%, minimal and low about  23%. In 2003:Q3 high was about 30%, moderate about 40%, minimal and low  about 30%.] 
NOTE. The data are annual for 1998-2001 and quarterly for 
2002-2003:Q3. High-risk loans are those in risk categories acceptable and 
classified. 
SOURCE. Federal Reserve Board, Survey of Terms of Business Lending. 
As with outstanding business loans, commercial 
banks have also moved to limit their exposure to 
committed lines of credit since the middle of 1998. 
A large portion of these loan commitments have 
traditionally been extended to large, investment-grade 
corporate borrowers to support their commercial 
paper programs in the event of a temporary disrup-
tion in the market for commercial paper. Accord-
ingly, banks typically viewed the lines as unlikely to 
be drawn down for purposes other than weathering a 
general liquidity squeeze. Nevertheless, backup lines 
for commercial paper carry the possibility that a 
bank will end up as the ''lender of last resort'' for a 
company shut out of the commercial paper market 
because of a rapid deterioration in its own credit-
worthiness. To safeguard against such an occurrence, 
credit lines usually include covenants that, in theory, 
are designed to prevent a drawdown by a company 
that is experiencing financial distress. This possibility 
was generally considered remote, especially because, 
before the past few years, issuers on the upper rungs 
of the investment-grade ladder had rarely succumbed 
to sudden default. 
Believing that commercial paper backup lines of 
credit were unlikely to be drawn down and that, even 
if drawn, they were unlikely to result in a loss, many 
large banks reportedly offered backup lines to some 
borrowers at very favorable terms. The first of these 
beliefs was challenged amid the financial market 
turmoil in the early fall of 1998, when interest rate 
spreads in the commercial paper markets rose sub-
stantially. Rather than issuing commercial paper in 
those circumstances, a few companies turned to their 
banks and drew down their revolving credit lines, 
which at the time offered significantly more-attractive 
terms than those available in the commercial paper 
market. Because of these unanticipated draws, banks 
reduced the size and increased the costs of the lines 
that they were offering to their large business custom-
ers and reassessed the conditions under which the 
funds could be drawn (chart 25). 
Chart 25. Net percentage of banks that reported tightening selected terms on credit lines, by size of borrower, 1996:Q2-2003:Q4 [chart contains two graphs: size of credit lines, and cost of credit lines. Top graph:  size of credit line. Plots two lines: large and middle-market, and small. Large and middle-market started 1996:Q2 at about -18%, then went up to about -5% in early 1997. Stays around there until mid 1998, when  it moves up to about 16% in late 1998. then down to about -3% in late 1999, then up to about 42% in late 2000. Then down to about-10% the end of 2003. Small starts 1996:Q2 at about 0. Then down to -8% in  early 1997, then stays between about -8 and 1% until mid 1999, then up to about 18% in late 2000. Then tends down, hitting about -2% the end of 2003.  Bottom graph: costs of credit lines. Plots two lines: large and middle-market, and small. Large and middle market starts 1996:Q2 at about -25%. It moves up to about 35% by the end of 1998. It goes down to about  5% mid 1999, then up to about 48% throughout 2001. Then drop to about 20% in mid 2002, then up to about 40% late 2002, then ending 2003 at about -5%. Small starts 1996:Q2 at about -8%. Then down  to about -25% in late 1997. Then up to about 25% in mid 2002. Then down to about 0% in late 2003.]  Note. See notes to chart 16. 
The spate of defaults by highly rated corporate 
borrowers during the recent economic slowdown 
raised questions about banks' second assumption 
regarding the likelihood and size of potential losses 
in investment-grade lending 
[note: 7]. For example, WorldCom drew down about $2.5 billion in bank 
lines just before revealing in June 2002 that it had substantially 
overstated its earnings; the company filed for bankruptcy the next 
month. Banks holding these lines, however, invoked covenants in the 
loan agreements that prevented Worldcom from drawing down the 
remainder of its reported $8 billion in credit lines. [end of note.] 
Indeed, even at the 
time of the May 2001 BLPS, large percentages of 
banks reportedly had tightened their lending stan-
dards over the previous year on commercial paper 
backup lines, especially for firms with weaker com-
mercial paper credit ratings. More than half the 
respondents indicated that they had begun charging 
higher up-front fees on backup lines and that they had 
increased the spreads that firms would pay if the lines 
were drawn. In addition, three-fourths of the domes-
tic banks reported that commercial paper backup 
lines were unprofitable on a standalone basis but that 
firms used the bank to provide other services—such 
as cash management—that made the overall relation-ship profitable for the bank. Banks also noted that 
they had moved to limit their risk by reducing the 
size of the loan commitments they were willing to 
offer, especially for lower-rated issuers of commer-
cial paper. Not surprisingly, respondents indicated 
that they had tightened standards and terms on credit 
lines because they were increasingly concerned about 
the possible deterioration in the credit quality of 
issuers and because they perceived a higher probabil-
ity that the lines would be drawn. 
[note: 8]. Over the past two years, asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) 
issued by ABcP conduits administered by domestic commercial banks 
declined, after increasing in 2000 and 2001. The decline in ABCP 
conduits may have reflected not only reduced issuance of ABCP 
because of borrowers' preference for longer-term debt but also banks' 
uncertainty about the accounting treatment of securitized assets. On 
January 17, 2003, the Financial Accounting Standards Board released 
Interpretation 46, ''Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities'' 
(FIN 46), a rule that stipulates the accounting treatment for certain 
structured finance vehicles, including ABCP conduits. FIN 46 raised 
the possibility that commercial banks would have to consolidate on 
their balance sheets the assets and liabilities of the ABCP conduits 
that they sponsored, an action that would require banks to set aside 
additional regulatory capital. FIN 46 is now slated for adoption for 
financial statements covering periods ending after December 15, 2003, 
and banks are reportedly continuing to explore ways to avoid consoli-
dation of their ABCP conduits. [end of note.] 
STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MARKET 
FOR C&I LOANS. 
Over the past decade, commercial banks have seen a 
number of changes in the structure of the market for 
C&I loans, and these changes have significantly 
affected the dynamics of demand and supply at large 
banks. The rapid growth of the syndicated loan mar-
ket, the effects of consolidation in the banking indus-
try, and the growing attractiveness of loan assets 
to institutional investors have boosted the partici-
pation of nonbank financial institutions in the market 
for bank loans. These trends have spawned a rela-
tively active secondary market, in which pieces of 
large syndicated loans are traded at market prices. 
The resulting availability of informative secondary 
prices on an increasing number of large loans has 
allowed commercial banks to manage their credit risk 
more effectively and to price new credit extensions 
more efficiently. The development of credit deriva-
tives, although used primarily by just a few of the 
largest banks, has given bankers another tool to man-
age the riskiness of their loan portfolios. 
With better management information systems, 
banking organizations have improved their ability to 
evaluate and quantify their risk-adjusted returns on 
capital for various products. unlike backup lines of 
credit, typical drawn business loans are profitable in 
themselves, but spreads on larger syndicated loans, 
especially those to investment-grade firms, tend to be 
quite narrow. Banks are willing to participate in these 
credit arrangements in part because by doing so they 
are more likely to establish a broader relationship 
with the borrower, which could allow them to sell 
additional fee-based services to the customer. More-
over, banks earn substantial fees for arranging and 
servicing these varied credit facilities for large bor-
rowers. In essence, these banks are moving away 
from their previous ''lend and hold'' business prac-
tices toward a fee-oriented ''originate and distribute'' 
business model. 
Syndicated Loan Market. 
In a syndicated loan, an arranger—almost exclusively 
a large financial institution or a small group of large 
institutions—acts like a bond underwriter by solicit-
ing a wide consortium of commercial banks and 
institutional investors such as investment banks, 
insurance companies, pension funds, and mutual funds to hold portions of the loan for a large corpo-
rate borrower. This type of lending differs from a 
traditional business loan model, in which a commer-
cial bank originates the loan and keeps the entire loan 
on its books until maturity. Although the arranger(s) 
of a syndicated loan usually have a broad relationship 
with the borrower, as is the case in the traditional 
lending model, many of the financial institutions in 
the syndicate are typically not relationship lenders. 
These financial institutions do not benefit from ancil-
lary business, and as a result, they are especially 
sensitive to the pricing and risk characteristics of the 
loan itself. Their sensitivity, in turn, has reinforced 
banks' attempts to increase fees and spreads on large 
business loans. 
According to the results of the Shared National 
Credit Survey (SNC), the volume of total commit-
ments (the sum of outstanding loans and unused loan 
commitments) in the U.S. syndicated loan market 
grew in real terms from about $900 billion in the 
early 1990s to almost $2 trillion at its peak in 2001; 
the real volume of outstanding loans also roughly 
doubled over the same period (chart 26). 
[note: 9]. Each year, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency conduct the Shared National Credit 
Survey, in which they collect data on the credit quality and other 
characteristics of all C&I loans and loan commitments of more than 
$20 million that are held by three or more supervised financial 
institutions. [end of note.] 
chart 26. Real value of total commitments and debt 
outstanding on syndicated loans, 1989-2003 
[graph plotting two data: a line for Commitments and bars  for outstanding, both in billions of 1996 dollars.  Commitments started 1989 at about $800 billion. Stayed  between 800 and $900 billion until 1994, when it started  going up, reaching about $1900 billion in 2001, then down  to about $1500 billion in 2003.  Outstanding starts 1989 at about $300 billion. It goes up  each year, reaching about $400 billion in 1991. Then it  goes down each hear, hitting about $320 billion in 1994.  Then up again, reaching about $700 billion in 2001. then  down, reaching about $550 billion in 2003.] 
NOTE. Commitments are outstanding debt plus unused commitments. The 
data are deflated by the price deflator for business-sector output (1996 = 100). 
SOURCE. Shared National Credit Survey (see text note 9). 
In the 
August 2000 BLPS, most banks with assets of more 
than $20 billion indicated that syndicated loans com-
posed a substantial percentage of their total C&I 
loans outstanding, and seven banks indicated that the 
portion was greater than 50 percent. According to the 
LPC, over the past decade, investment-grade compa-
nies have accounted for an average of about two-
thirds of gross issuance in the syndicated loan mar-
ket. 
[note: 10]. Gross issuance is defined as the sum of new loans and credit 
lines, increases in the size of existing credit agreements, and the 
refinancing of existing credit facilities. The LPC only recently began 
reporting net issuance—new loans and increases in existing credit 
facilities—separately from refinanced credits. [end of note.] 
The share of gross issuance accounted for by 
below-investment-grade firms, however, increased 
somewhat over the past two years, partly reflecting 
the greater refinancing by such firms and an increased 
desire to hold these types of assets by nonbanks. 
Investment banks are also major participants in 
the syndicated loan market. During the evolution of 
the market for business loans, customer demand for 
one-stop shopping and the entry of commercial bank 
affiliates into investment banking using section 20 
subsidiaries blurred many of the distinctions between 
investment banking and commercial banking. 
[note: 11]. In April 1987, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System reinterpreted section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, allowing 
bank holding companies to establish subsidiaries to conduct certain 
bank-ineligible investment banking activities, such as underwriting of 
corporate bonds and equities. [end of note.] 
The 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act formally acknowledged 
these market developments and further reduced or 
eliminated some restrictions on the capital market 
activities of commercial bank affiliates. This deregu-
lation, in turn, led investment banks to step up the 
underwriting of syndicated loans so that they could 
also offer a full range of financing options to their 
corporate customers. However, investment banks' 
relatively smaller balance sheets, higher funding 
costs, and different traditional business models make 
these institutions more reluctant than banks to retain 
the loans that they underwrite, especially if the loans 
by themselves are not profitable enough to meet the 
internal hurdle rates of investment banks. Investment 
banks are particularly averse to holding revolving 
lines of credit, which can result in large, unexpected 
demands for funds that the investment bank must 
finance on short notice. Partly to mitigate these prob-
lems and partly to compete better in the syndicated 
loan market, a few investment banks have acquired 
depository institutions or established them within 
their holding company structure. 
Many other financial institutions—including insur-
ance companies, prime rate funds, and pension 
funds—have reportedly participated in the syndicated 
loan market for more than a decade. More recently, 
the market is said to have piqued the interest of 
high-yield mutual funds and hedge funds. These insti-
tutional participants tend to be interested in term 
loans or facilities with high utilization, and they do not deal in ancillary businesses that investment and 
commercial banks may pursue through a relationship 
with a borrower (for example, cash management and 
bond underwriting). As a result, they are most likely 
to purchase only drawn loans that they view as fully 
priced to reflect the riskiness of the borrower, and 
they also prefer loans with longer maturities. Because 
these characteristics are attached more often to 
below-investment-grade loans than to the lines of 
credit for investment-grade firms, institutional inves-
tors hold a substantial share of riskier syndicated 
loans. 
Other important pieces of the institutional loan 
market are special-purpose investment vehicles that 
purchase and hold loans (collateralized loan obliga-
tions, or CLOs) or, more generally, loans in combina-
tion with other debt instruments (collateralized debt 
obligations, or CDOs). Most CLOs and CDOs are not 
actively managed, partly because accounting conven-
tions make it more likely that actively managed struc-
tures will need to be consolidated onto the balance 
sheet of the sponsoring institution. CLOs and CDOs 
fund their investments primarily by issuing debt 
instruments, which are structured to match the inves-
tors' risk-and-return profiles through a process called 
tranching. 
[note: 12]. The highest tranche pays investors the smallest return but has 
the least risk by virtue of having first claim on the cash flows 
generated by the underlying assets in the CLO or CDO. The middle 
tranches pay somewhat higher rates of return in exchange for inves-
tors' willingness to bear more risk. Investors in the lowest tranche are 
paid only after all the higher tranches have been paid in full, thus 
exposing them to the first losses in the portfolio. [end of note.] 
Financial institutions sponsor these vehi-
cles to profit from the fees earned for providing these 
products to their investment customers. Major com-
mercial banks have also used CLOs to move dis-
tressed or otherwise unwanted loans off their balance 
sheets. 
The decline in the volume of C&I loans at com-
mercial banks has been partly offset by increased 
holdings of such loans by nonbanks, which the SNC 
defines as independent investment brokerages, invest-
ment vehicles (such as CLOs), and other institutional 
investors. The SNC data show that the share of total 
syndicated loan commitments held by nonbanks has 
increased from 8 percent in 2001 to 11 percent in 
2003 (table 1). 
Table 1. Share of holdings of syndicated and adversely rated 
loan commitments, by type of lender, 2001-2003 
Percent 
Loan commitment and holder  2001  2002  2003 
Total syndicated loan 
commitments: 
U.S. banks  46  45  45  Total syndicated loan  commitments: Foreign banking organizations 
46  45  44  Total syndicated loan  commitments: Nonbanks
1 
8  10  11 
Own loan commitments that are 
adversely rated
2 
All institutions  5.7  8.4  9.3  Own loan commitments that are  adversely rated: U.S. banks 
5.1  6.4  5.8  Own loan commitments that are  adversely rated: Foreign banking organizations 
4.7  7.3  9.0  Own loan commitments that are  adversely rated: Nonbanks
1 
14.6  23.0  24.4 
1. Nonbanks include independent investment brokerages, investment vehi-
cles, and other institutional investors. 
2. These loan commitments are classified as ''substandard,'' ''doubtful,'' or 
''loss.'' Substandard loans are characterized by the distinct possibility that the 
bank will sustain some loss if the deficiencies are not corrected. An asset classi-
fied as doubtful has all the weaknesses inherent in one classified as substandard 
with the added characteristic that the weaknesses make the collection or liqui-
dation in full highly questionable and improbable. Assets classified as loss are 
considered uncollectible and of such little value that their continuance as bank-
able assets is not warranted, even though partial recovery may be effected in the 
future. 
SOURCE. Shared National Credit Survey. 
Moreover, a significant and growing 
portion of the holdings of nonbanks is made up of 
adversely rated credits, which increased to almost 
one-fourth of their total commitments in 2003. Non-
banks apparently stepped up the acquisition of 
adversely rated credits because these loans have a 
relatively attractive yield-risk tradeoff and their 
workout can often be quite profitable. Responses to 
the October 2003 BLPS suggest that a substantial 
part of the increase in adversely rated credits at 
nonbanks may reflect purchases of distressed loans 
from commercial banks. The most-often-cited rea-
sons that survey respondents gave for selling their 
adversely rated loans were to trim the overall credit 
risk of their C&I loan portfolios and to reduce expo-
sure to particular firms. 
Secondary Loan Market. 
The growth of the syndicated loan market and the 
increased participation of institutional investors 
helped spur the development of a secondary market 
for trading pieces of syndicated loans. The real vol-
ume of loan trading in the secondary market has 
increased fairly steadily during the past decade, from 
less than $20 billion a year in the early 1990s to more 
than $100 billion in recent years (chart 27). 
Chart 27. Real value of loans traded in the U.S. secondary market, 1991-2003:H1  Bar graph plotting two data: Par and Distressed in billions of 1996 dollars. In 1991 par and distressed were both about $5 billion. In 1992 they were about $6 billion each. In 1993 Par was about  $7 billion and Distressed about $9 billion. In 1994, Par was about $14 billion and Distressed about $7 billion. In 1995 Par was about $25 billion and Distressed about $10 billion. In 1996, Par  was about $32 billion and Distressed about $7 billion. In 1997, Par was about $50 billion and distressed about $10 billion. In 1998, Par was about $62 billion and distressed about $13 billion.  In 1999 Par was about $65 billion and Distressed about $10 billion. In 2000 Par was about $74 billion and Distressed about $21 billion. In 2001 Par was about $70 billion and Distressed about  $38 billion. In 2002 Par was about $60 billion and Distressed about $44 billion. In 2003:H1 Par was about $37 billion and Distressed about $25 billion.]  Note. The data are deflated by the price deflator for business-sector output (1996 = 100). Source. Loan Pricing Corporation. 
Trading 
is most active in the below-investment-grade seg-
ment of the market, according to data from the LPC, 
and an increased percentage of the recent activity has 
been in distressed assets. The higher trading volumes 
have made pricing somewhat more transparent for 
many of the largest and most-liquid loans, for which 
the industry has taken steps to determine and publish 
timely market quotes. Nonetheless, liquidity in the 
secondary market for C&I loans is reportedly ham-
pered by the assignment fees that banks charge loan 
investors to cover the cost of transferring ownership 
in the pieces of loans that are traded. In addition, market participants note that the documentation 
required to trade loans is substantial, and thus the 
settlement period for loan trades is considerably 
longer than that for bond or equity trades. 
The increased depth of the secondary loan market 
and the availability of representative price quotes 
have apparently allowed banks to manage their C&I 
loan portfolios more actively. Indeed, during the most 
recent downturn, a significant number of banks sold 
distressed loans into the secondary market, a move 
that allowed them to accelerate charge-offs and 
thereby reduce delinquencies, as well as to reduce the 
riskiness of the loans on their books. The existence of 
representative market quotes on the prices of loans is 
also important for institutional participants, many of 
which mark their portfolios to market more regularly 
than do commercial banks to follow either market 
convention or regulatory requirements. 
The increased liquidity in the secondary loan mar-
ket has reportedly led to some convergence in bond 
and loan spreads, especially in the leveraged segment 
of the market. In the August 2002 BLPS, a significant 
percentage of larger banks indicated that they consid-
ered bond market prices to be helpful for monitor-
ing the credit quality of their business customers. In 
addition, the pricing for many lines of credit is based 
on ratings grids, a practice that implies that the firm 
pays a higher spread on its draws if its credit rating is 
downgraded and a lower spread if its credit rating is 
upgraded. Most recently, a few syndicated revolving 
credit lines have reportedly incorporated bond-linked 
pricing, in which the spread charged on a draw from 
the credit line is determined by the prevailing spread 
on the company's bonds at the time of the draw. 
Credit Derivatives. 
Some of the largest commercial banks are increas-
ingly using credit derivatives to help manage the 
riskiness of their business loan portfolios. In one of 
the most common forms of credit derivative—the 
credit default swap (CDS)—the beneficiary, an inves-
tor that will receive a payment if the issuer defaults 
or experiences another pre-specified adverse out-
come, contracts with a guarantor, a financial institu-
tion that will pay the losses in that event. 
[note: 13]. The treatment of restructuring, in which a firm does not techni-
cally default but rather changes the terms on its debt instruments, has 
presented problems during the development of the CDS market. The 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association has issued three sets 
of guidelines to clarify the way in which guarantors and beneficiaries 
should treat restructuring, and it continues to work toward a standard 
definition. [end of note.] 
In return, 
the beneficiary pays the guarantor a fee equal to a 
specified number of basis points times the amount 
of credit protection that it wishes to purchase. The 
amount charged by the guarantor for the contract is 
based, of course, on the likelihood that the firm in 
question will experience a specified adverse credit 
event and on the expected value of the underlying 
debt instrument in such circumstances. 
The value of credit derivatives purchased and sold 
by commercial banks has increased rapidly over the 
past decade (chart 28). 
Chart 28. Value of credit derivatives held by banks  as guarantors and as beneficiaries, 1997-2003:Q3  [chart has two graphs: Notional amount held as guarantor and as beneficiary,  and share of credit derivatives held by ten largest banks.  Top graph: Notional amount held as guarantor and as beneficiary. Bar graph  of those two data. In 1997 Notional amount held as guarantor was about  $10 billion, Notional amount held as beneficiary was about $25 billion.  In 1998 guarantor was about $50 billion, beneficiary was about $65 billion.  In 1999, guarantor was about $90 billion, beneficiary about $125 billion.  In 2000, guarantor was about $150 billion, beneficiary about $200 billion.  In 2001 guarantor was about $175 billion, beneficiary about $195 billion.  In 2002 guarantor was about $250 billion, beneficiary about $275 billion.  In 2003:Q3 guarantor was about $345 billion, beneficiary about $410 billion.]  [bottom graph: Share of credit derivatives held by ten largest banks. Plotting  two lines: as a beneficiary and as guarantor. As beneficiary starts 1997 at  about $99.5 billion, stays around there until 1998, when it drops, reaching  about $92.5 billion the end of 1998. Then a slow climb to about $98 billion  in the end of 2002, then a fall to about $94 billion by 2003:Q3.  As Guarantor starts 1997 at about $99.5 billion but immediately drops to  about $87 billion by the second half of 1997. Then up to about $97.5 billion  in early 1998. Down to about $95 billion early 1999, then a climb to about  $99.5 billion in early 2000. It stays between there and about $98 billion until  mid 2003, when it drops to about $96.5 billion in 2003:Q3.]  Note. Percentages are plotted at a quarterly frequency. Source. Call Reports. 
However, the overall number 
of banks that transact in credit derivatives is quite 
small: As of the third quarter of 2003, the ten 
largest banks held 97 percent of the total credit 
derivatives for which banks act as guarantors and 
94 percent of the total credit derivatives for which 
banks are the beneficiaries. A few of the largest 
banks also act as dealers in the market for credit 
derivatives and therefore hold substantial percent-
ages of both the industry's beneficiary positions and 
its guarantor positions. Since 1997, when data on 
banks' holdings of credit derivatives first became 
available in the quarterly Reports of Condition and 
Income (Call Reports), the U.S. banking sector has 
generally maintained a small net beneficiary position 
in credit derivatives. However, banks' position as a 
net beneficiary increased considerably in the first half 
of 2003, perhaps because of a greater use of these 
instruments to hedge exposure in their C&I loan 
portfolios. 
Like corporate bonds and syndicated loans, CDSs 
are actively traded. Increasingly, loan investors are 
presented with opportunities for arbitrage when the 
spreads among these three markets diverge. For 
example, if the CDS for a particular firm is yielding a 
higher return than is a loan to the same firm, a bank that wishes to obtain credit exposure to that firm can 
choose to act as the guarantor on a CDS for the firm's 
bonds rather than making the loan. The increasing 
use of CDSs in managing risk may have also resulted 
in a greater willingness of banks to make loans to 
companies for which they can purchase credit protec-
tion in the CDS market. 
The January 2003 BLPS asked banks why they 
used CDSs and how their participation in that market 
had affected the total amount of C&I loans that they 
made. The reasons most often cited by banks for 
selling CDS protection were that it was occasionally 
more profitable than direct lending and that it helped 
them diversify credit risk. Banks that had purchased 
credit derivatives to protect against loan losses over-
whelmingly reported that they preferred buying credit 
protection to selling a loan in the secondary market 
because the purchase of the CDS did not affect their 
relationship with the borrower. On net, banks 
reported that the development of the CDS market had 
a small positive effect on their supply of business 
loans. 
Industry Consolidation. 
Since the passage in 1994 of the Riegle-Neal Act, 
which phased out many of the barriers to interstate 
branching by commercial banks, consolidation has 
accelerated. The 100 largest banks now hold almost 
75 percent of total banking assets and 77 percent 
of outstanding C&I loans, up from 56 percent and 
66 percent, respectively, in 1994 (chart 29). 
Chart 29. Concentration in the banking industry among 
the 10 largest and 100 largest banks, 
1988-2003:Q3 
[chart has two graphs: share of total industry assets, and share of total  outstanding C&I loans in banking industry.  [top graph: share of total industry assets. Plots two lines: 100 largest and  10 largest.  100 largest starts 1988 at about 52% then rises to about 75% in 2003.  10 largest starts 1998 at about 23% then rises to about 45% in 2003.] 
[bottom graph: share of total outstanding C&I loans in  banking industry. Plotting two lines: 100 largest and 10  largest.  100 largest starts at about 62% in 1988 then rises to about  78% in 2003.  10 largest starts at about 28% in 1988 and stays around  there until 1995, when it starts rising, ending 2003 at about  46%.] 
SOURCE. Call Reports. 
Simi-
larly, the ten largest commercial banks hold 43 per-
cent of total banking assets and 47 percent of out-
standing C&I loans, compared with 25 percent and 
28 percent, respectively, in 1994. These increases in 
industry concentration may be somewhat overstated 
because of mergers that have occurred among banks 
that were already within the same holding company; 
even so, a substantial number of mergers among the 
largest holding companies have occurred over the 
same period. 
One effect of consolidation on the C&I loan market 
is that it has left fewer commercial banks to partici-
pate in the syndication process. Reportedly, a merged 
bank tends to offer smaller loans and credit lines in the syndicated loan market than the combined amount 
that the two predecessor banks had offered before the 
merger. As a result, market participants have argued 
that consolidation has reduced the capacity of the 
syndicated loan market to meet the credit demands of 
some large corporate borrowers. On the other hand, 
the increased number of institutional participants in 
that market should have at least partially offset such a 
decline in lending capacity. 
CONCLUSION. 
Despite the appreciable deterioration in asset quality 
and the reduced demand for credit by business bor-
rowers over the past several years, commercial banks 
have remained highly profitable and well capitalized. 
In contrast to the 1990-91 period, when large losses 
held down banks' earnings and eroded their capital, 
during the recent recession banks were well posi-
tioned to lend to creditworthy business customers 
willing to pay the higher loan fees and lending 
spreads that banks have increasingly demanded as 
part of their improved risk management. The eco-
nomic slowdown and the tightening of credit stan-
dards, however, sharply reduced the number of 
creditworthy firms. Meanwhile, the customers that 
remained creditworthy generally had less need for 
external funds. 
To help determine the relative importance of the 
various supply and demand factors contributing to 
the runoff in C&I loans, the October 2002 BLPS 
asked banks to rank several possible reasons for the 
decline in business loans during the first nine months 
of that year. More than three-fourths of the respon-
dents indicated that the most important factor behind 
the sharp contraction in C&I loans during that period 
was reduced demand from creditworthy borrowers. 
The second-most-important factor was that the dete-
rioration in business credit quality had reduced the 
number of firms that banks viewed as creditworthy. 
Banks rated the incremental effect of their own efforts 
to tighten lending standards as only the third-most-
important factor and stated that increases in spreads 
and fees on business loans had the least effect on 
business loan flows. In the opinion of the banks 
responding to the BLPS, then, the decline in business 
loans was clearly related more to reduced demand 
than to restrictions in supply. 
Nonetheless, supply effects appear to have played 
an important role. Staff research suggests that the 
large banks on the survey panel that most often 
reported tightening credit standards from 1999 to the 
end of 2001 experienced the largest contraction in 
business lending whereas banks that reported tighten-
ing in only a few quarters or not at all had a smaller 
decline in outstanding C&I loans and credit lines. 
[note: 14]. See William F. Bassett and Mark Carlson, ''Profits and Balance 
Sheet Developments at U.S. Commercial Banks in 2001,'' Federal 
Reserve Bulletin, vol. 88 (June 2002), pp. 259-88. [end of note.] 
Asked why they had tightened lending standards, 
however, respondents to the BLPS often mentioned 
industry-specific problems and the resulting decline 
in the creditworthiness of firms in those industries. 
That the industries hit hardest by the economic 
slowdown and other events at the beginning of 
this decade—telecommunications and airlines, for 
example—traditionally borrowed from large banks 
may have magnified the declines in C&I loans at 
those banks. 